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Commentary Commentaire
T he rapid growth of veterinary specialty practices has created a number of vexatious ethical issues relevant to veterinary 
medicine. The preeminent question pertains to “the duty to 
refer.” Do primary care practitioners have such a moral duty? If 
so, when does this duty arise? Does it pertain in all cases where 
specialized knowledge is relevant to a disease?
This raises the fundamental question of “Veterinary Ethics” 
— namely, does the veterinarian ideally have primary obligation 
to the client/owner or the animal? (1) There are 2 possible ideal 
types that a veterinarian can aim for — the Garage Mechanic 
Model or the Pediatrician Model (1). On the Garage Mechanic 
Model, the practitioner has primary obligation to the animal 
owner, just as a car’s mechanic has primary obligation to the car’s 
owner. On the Pediatrician Model, the veterinarian is like the 
pediatrician, whose primary moral obligation is to the patient; 
at best, the owner or parent pays the bills.
Most veterinarians accept the Pediatrician Model, even though 
society does not as yet stand behind it, as it does with children. 
This is not surprising; Plato made a similar point over 2000 years 
ago. A shepherd he says, in his or her role as shepherd, has a 
primary duty to care for and better the sheep. Although they are 
paid for this, it is in their capacity as wage earner, which does not 
trump their primary obligation to the animal (2).
Issues facing referring veterinarians
Adherence to the Pediatrician Model provides a prima facie 
answer to the preeminent question regarding referral: If the 
animal will benefit from the ministrations of a specialist, say an 
oncologist, and the primary care veterinarian is not well versed 
in oncology, the veterinarian has a moral duty to refer and defer 
to greater expertise.
This, however, is not the end of the story. The general practi-
tioner enjoys certain marked advantages over the specialist. First, 
the general practitioner most likely knows the animal and should 
be more adept at picking up subtle signs of pain and distress, 
or other behavioral signs specific to that animal. He or she and 
probably knows the animal’s peculiarities, for example, if it has 
an idiosyncratic reaction to certain drugs, is fearful of men but 
not women, is a fear biter, etc. Second, the general practitioner 
knows the family unit, the animal’s home circumstances, the life-
style, the personality of the owner, the owner’s degree of medical 
sophistication, and any tensions in the household that may be 
relevant to the animal’s condition; all enormously important to 
assuring compliance with treatment regimens. For example, the 
referring practitioner knows not to expect the owner to give a 
treatment every 4 hours, because the owner works 14-h days; 
knows that the household contains 6 raucous small children, so 
that there is no hope of the animal resting undisturbed; knows 
that the neurotic owner will never cut back the animal’s rations; 
knows that the owner will never rake through the stool looking 
for blood; and, most importantly, knows not only how to trans-
late biomedical technicalities for the client in question, but also 
how to assure that what the specialist says is understood and not 
reinterpreted through wishful thinking. What one perceives does 
not depend one’s level of medical knowledge alone. We hear not 
only with our ears, but also with our beliefs, expectations, theo-
ries, hopes, biases, etc. As philosophers might say, “Perception 
is theory-laden.” For example, when a medical professional says, 
“cancer,” patients almost immediately expect a death sentence, 
preceded by exquisite suffering. While there is no guarantee that 
the referring practitioner can effect communication, knowing the 
client certainly provides an advantage the specialist lacks.
Specialists are prone to perceive with the theoretical biases 
and predilections of their specialty. For example, the specialty of 
oncology, both in human and in veterinary medicine, has taken 
as its goal, extending length of life. The oncologist “wins” if the 
quantity of life is prolonged; although, the quality of life has his-
torically been ignored in both human and veterinary medicine, 
leading many suffering human patients to demand euthanasia. 
Insofar as quality of life looms large in a client’s mind, and is 
everything to an animal, and since all indications are that ani-
mals are incapable of understanding that current suffering, if 
treated, can mean extended life later, the referring practitioner, 
knowing the consequences of the treatment modalities for the 
animal’s well-being, can and should serve as an animal advocate 
by mediating between specialist and client and tempering the 
natural specialist zeal to try everything and some clients’ desire 
to keep the animal alive at all costs.
Thus, in my view, the referring practitioner can and must play 
a major role in referral situations. This is not to suggest that the 
mediation be done without compensation; the process described 
can be significantly consumptive of the referring veterinarian’s 
time and energy, so it is perfectly reasonable for referring vet-
erinarians to charge for the time they spend mediating between 
client and specialist.
Kipperman (3) has raised the intriguing question of whether 
the general veterinarian ought to be “a guardian of the client’s 
pocketbook,” pointing out that assuming such a role sometimes 
serves to block the animal’s receiving state-of-the-art care, and 
derides such a role. Kipperman thus condemns the idea that vet-
erinarians should blatantly worry about the client’s pocketbook, 
but I think that is something of an oversimplification. In some 
cases, the referring veterinarian is somewhat the guardian of the 
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clients’ pocketbook. Suppose the primary care veterinarian knows 
that the client is a single mother who is strapped for cash, and 
suppose the animal is a 20-year-old cat with kidney failure, where 
doing everything for the animal may become psychologically con-
fused with doing everything for the client. The client has heard 
about the possibility of a kidney transplant and feels compelled 
to pursue that treatment modality, which she cannot even begin 
to afford. The prognosis for the animal is dismal, and even if 
the surgery is successful, the quality of life will be poor. In such 
cases, the referring veterinarian should use his or her Aesculapian 
authority to persuade the client not to choose a delusive goal (4) 
and similarly discourage the client from pursuing dialysis (which 
creates suffering) or expensive new experimental chemotherapy 
remedies that may also cause suffering and may bleed the client 
financially or emotionally, or both.
In general, then, although the primary veterinarian has a 
prima facie obligation to put the animal first and to refer, there 
are occasions where the situation is hopeless and will cause 
the animal major suffering and where it would be the primary 
veterinarian’s role to temper the clients’ zeal for trying anything, 
even at the expense of animal’s quality of life. A specialist is not 
likely to temper such excess; after all, these cutting edge treat-
ments are what they do. Sometimes primary concern for the 
animal, therefore, dictates discouraging referral to a specialist!
It is for this reason I am quite skeptical about “pawspice.” 
These “for-profit” hospices that treat terminally ill animals, pro-
vide hope for the owners for keeping the animal alive as long as 
possible and, in some cases, try as many unproven treatments as 
the client wishes. Certainly, palliative care is of great importance, 
but does not outweigh long-term suffering.
Thus the primary care veterinarian must find the middle 
ground between failing to refer at the expense of state-of-the-
art treatment that could benefit the animal and referring to all 
sorts of extreme treatments or those that may cause suffering 
the client wishes to try. This, in turn, raises the “hot-button” 
issue of complementary and alternative medicine. Should vet-
erinarians refer to practitioners of such unproven, nonevidence- 
based medicine? In a word, my answer is “no!” (5) While the 
client may freely seek any and all such modalities, it is not the 
job of the veterinarian to validate such choices. Recall that 
society charters veterinarians to be science-based; the American 
Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) explicitly affirms that 
for accreditation veterinary schools must be rooted in science 
(6). That is the societal expectation, and scientific knowledge 
is a major defense against malpractice.
Issues facing specialists
What of the specialist to whom cases are referred? Foremost, the 
specialist has a moral obligation to stay in good communication 
with the referring clinician, keeping him or her apprised of case 
development and using his or her knowledge of the client’s situ-
ation to assure compliance with treatments and regimens, and 
to seek counsel. Veterinary medicine, paradoxically, is more of 
a “people” profession than human medicine, where the legal 
system backs the doctor even if he or she must work through 
the parent or guardian. The veterinarian, conversely, must keep 
the client happy to be allowed to continue to treat. The special-
ist, therefore, needs the primary veterinarian’s knowledge of the 
client and the client’s psychology.
Occasionally, the specialist’s distance from the client provides 
a different set of moral obligations. Knowing the client well 
and being close to the client can get in the way of the primary 
care veterinarian’s advocacy for the animal’s quality of life. For 
example, a situation where the referring veterinarian knows that 
the dog is an elderly client’s life and life-line may mitigate his or 
her advocacy for the animal by rationalizing the animal’s pro-
longed suffering and deferring to the client’s emotional needs. 
In such cases, the specialist may need to speak for the animal. 
Not being closely enmeshed in the client’s life, the specialist can 
more easily say, “The animal is suffering, and it is time to let 
it go. Additional treatment is torture for the sake of living, at 
most, a few more months of poor quality of life.”
I strongly disagree with some veterinary circles that affirm that 
a veterinarian should never say “it is time for euthanasia,” and 
should never answer the client’s plea, “what would you do, doc?” 
With your better knowledge of the animal’s suffering, disinter-
ested objectivity, and concern for the animal’s welfare, it is your 
responsibility to alert the client to suffering that he or she chooses 
to ignore, and to recommend the blessing of euthanasia to bring 
the suffering to an end. Although, ultimately, euthanasia is the 
client’s decision, your Aesculapian authority can heavily influence 
that decision, not only for the benefit of the animal, but also in 
granting the client absolution from the guilt that deciding on 
euthanasia can bring. Or, correlatively, you can use that authority 
to work against premature euthanasia decisions.
Just as a primary care veterinarian has an obligation to refer 
when it is in the best interest of the animal, in some situations, a 
specialist has the obligation to return some clients to the primary 
care veterinarian. Suppose you are an orthopedic surgeon who 
has successfully treated a dog referred to you for a complicated 
crush injury, and 5 years later, the same client brings a dog to 
you with a simple fracture that you know the primary care vet-
erinarian is quite capable of treating, you have an obligation to 
refer the client back to the primary care veterinarian. This sort 
of backwards referral would go a long way to alleviating general 
practitioners’ concerns that specialists erode their practice.
The emergence of ever increasingly sophisticated specialties 
in veterinary medicine should not denigrate general practice 
and the role of general practitioners. Without generalists, there 
could be no specialists — who would do the relevant referring? 
It was in response to this issue that human medicine was forced 
to make general practice itself a specialty!
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